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JESP SYMPOSIUM 
 
CLIMATE CHANGE AND SOCIAL POLICY 
 
Ian Gough*, James Meadowcroft, John Dryzek, Jürgen Gerhards, Holger Lengfeld, 
Anil Markandya and Ramon Ortiz 
* Lead author for contacting 
 
 
INTRODUCTION1 
Ian Gough 
 
Climate change is surely one of the most encompassing and egregious threats in 
Europe today, so it is appropriate that we consider its implications for social policy in 
Europe. It is true that climate change is a separate agenda, the preserve of a distinct 
academic and epistemic community, scholarly discourse, policy community, institutional 
structures and modes of governance; but the linkages between these two issues – 
climate change and its policy corollaries, and the ‘traditional’ domain of social policies – 
seem to us so strong and salient that they should be aired in a social policy journal. 
 
Social policy is often conceived as the public management of social risks (Esping-
Andersen 1999: 36). Some of these risks are timeless and universal, such as ill health, 
others are specific to certain types of society, such as unemployment or ethnic 
discrimination, others are more ephemeral. Climate change is a new risk that is big, 
global, long-term, persistent and uncertain (Stern 2006: 25). It thus confronts us with a 
qualitatively new agenda in social policy, or so I shall argue. Its implications for, and 
linkages with, economic policy are now centre-stage, yet there is very little on the 
linkages with social policy – for example, there is no reference to ‘social policy’ in the 
index of the 800-page Fourth Assessment Report (on Mitigation of Climate Change) of 
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC 2007). 
 
The bald facts and high-consensus predictions of climate change are by now well-known 
and can be briefly stated. Most climate change models predict a doubling of pre-
industrial levels of greenhouse gases between 2030 and 2060, which would result in a 
rise of global mean temperatures by between 2-5°C. The higher range would be far 
outside the experience of human civilisation and comparable to the difference between 
temperatures during the last ice age and today. Whatever is done now, because of 
inertia in the climate system past emissions of greenhouse gases will drive increases in 
global mean temperature for another several decades. Furthermore most of these 
models do not take account of likely positive feedbacks which will amplify the 
temperature rise. Alongside global warming the direct effects in the coming decades will 
include increasing risk of droughts and floods, more abrupt and large-scale changes in 
the climate systems and a rise in sea levels.  
 
Most models predict significantly greater direct negative impacts on human habitats and 
livelihoods in tropical regions, which are also mainly poorer countries. This is of 
overwhelming importance in global debates. However, we shall restrict ourselves here to 
                                                 
1 Thanks to Graham Room and Traute Meyer, for earlier discussions, ideas and drafts 
about the whole issue of climate change and social policy, and for much subsequent 
editorial advice. Thanks also to Anna Coote for helpful discussions and comments. 
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the implications for wellbeing, social risks and social policies in Europe. These fall into 
four categories.  
1. Direct risks: Mediterranean regions will see rising water stress, heat waves and 
forest fires, and coastal regions of Europe are vulnerable to rising sea-levels, 
notably the Netherlands. However, more northerly countries may benefit. 
2. Indirect risks: including greater distress migration from tropical regions, notably 
Africa, into Europe, recently highlighted by the EU…. 
3. Implications of climate change adaptation policies: there may be greater fiscal 
competition from necessary environmental policies to adapt to climate change, 
such as sea defences and removing housing from flood plains. 
4. Implications of climate change mitigation policies: these include carbon budgets 
and/or higher carbon taxes and prices in the rich world which would be 
necessary to stabilise carbon emissions in the second half of the century. 
 
A new research strategy should be aware of all four. In particular, new concerns with 
social justice and social policy are raised by the pressures (moral and practical) to 
drastically curb carbon emissions in Europe alongside the rest of the rich world. It is the 
nexus between environmental and social policies that needs to be urgently explored. 
This symposium bgins to rehearse the implications of climate change and climate 
change policies for the established ideas and practices of social policy and welfare 
states. After introducing the contributors the remainder of this introduction considers in 
turn the conceptual, empirical, policy and governance implications of climate change for 
social policy in contemporary Europe.  
 
The contributors  
 
We have deliberately invited short contributions to this symposium from experts in 
climate change and environmental policy outside the field of social policy: from political 
science, sociology and economics. 
James Meadowcroft holds the Canada Research Chair in Governance for Sustainable 
Development at Carleton University, Canada. He researches the ways in which 
governments are (or are not) adjusting their practices and policies in the face of 
emerging environment problems in order to promote more sustainable patterns of 
societal development. His publications include Implementing Sustainable Development: 
Strategies and Initiatives in High Consumption Societies (2000a) and ‘From welfare state 
to ecostate?’ (2005). In this contribution he compares the emergence of the 
environmental state with the earlier emergence of the welfare state. He considers a 
range of linkages between social and environmental policies today, concluding that they 
have the potential to draw together and reinstate the original impulse behind the idea of 
‘sustainable development’. 
John Dryzek is Professor of Political Science at the Australian National University. His 
work in environmental politics ranges from green political philosophy to studies of 
environmental discourses and movements. His many publications include Green States 
and Social Movements: Environmentalism in the United States, United Kingdom, 
Germany, and Norway (2003) and The Politics of the Earth (2005). In this contribution he 
argues that coordinated market economies with social democratic welfare states tend to 
see economic and ecological values as mutually reinforcing, and are best placed to 
navigate the challenge presented by climate change to social policy. Liberal market 
economies with less developed welfare states tend to oppose environmental and 
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economic values and will face greater difficulties. Yet in the longer term, new forms of 
governance for climate change may undermine traditionally state-centric forms of social 
policy. 
 
Jürgen Gerhards is Professor of Macrosociology at the Free University of Berlin, 
Germany. His main research concerns the cultural aspects of European integration and  
the value attitudes of European citizens. His publications include Cultural Overstrech? 
Differences between old and new member states of the EU and Turkey (2007). Holger 
Lengfeld is Professor of Sociology of Contemporary Societies at the University of Hagen, 
Germany. He researches social justice, social inequality and attitudes towards European 
integration and his publications include Organisierte Ungleichheit: Wie Organisationen 
Lebenschancen beeinflussen (Organised Inequality: How Organisations influence life 
chances, 2007). Here they provide an empirical study addressing two issues: the 
pioneering role of the EU in environmental policy, and the degree of support of EU 
citizens for the ideas of environmental protection.  
 
Anil Markandya is currently Professor of Economics at the University of Bath, UK and 
Director of Applied Research in FEEM, Italy, and recently served as Lead Economist at 
the World Bank. He has published widely in the areas of climate change, environmental 
valuation, environmental policy, energy and environment, and green accounting.  He 
was a lead author for Chapters of the 3rd and 4th IPCC Assessment Reports on Climate 
Change, which were awarded a share of the Nobel Peace Prize in 2007.  Ramon Ortiz 
works with him as Research Officer in Environmental Economics at Bath University. 
They undertake an empirical survey of the impact of carbon taxation on social 
inequalities, concluding that these would be mildly regressive, but manageable, in the 
European context. 
This introduction and the following contributions are intended to sketch out some of the 
ways that climate change will impinge on social policy in the coming years and to 
suggest a framework for research. We invite readers to take up this challenge. It may 
provide the topic for a Special Issue in the future.  
 
Conceptual challenges 
If social policy is the public management of social risks, are the risks posed by climate 
change qualitatively different to those addressed by conventional social policies? There 
are certainly similarities as Meadowcroft notes: ‘Both are political responses to long term 
societal change related to industrialization, urbanization and democratization. Both have 
been called into being to wrestle with issues that cannot adequately be addressed by 
markets and voluntary action. And both shift patterns of ‘normal’ economic interaction 
(through regulation, fiscal transfers, and so on), while operating within significant 
economic and political constraints’. Both also generate conflicts about the distribution of 
resources (witness the commitment to bio-fuels fuelling a record rise in world grain 
prices). These parallels may suggest that CC could be absorbed as an emerging risk 
into the corpus of social policies. In welfare states it could enter the political settlement 
as part of the collective responsibilities of governments. In existing welfare state regimes 
it may reconfigure the roles of states, markets and families, but it would not define a 
distinct new regime. 
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Another fruitful way of understanding the emergence and nature of ‘social policy’ in 
Western nations is as a reaction to capitalism and the commodification of labour power. 
Seizing on Marx’s insight, Karl Polanyi regarded labour as a ‘fictitious commodity’. While 
it must be organised in markets, and while these markets are an absolutely vital part of 
the economic system, labour is not a commodity because it is not produced for sale and 
‘cannot be detached from the rest of life’ (Polanyi 1944/1957: 72). Thus social policies 
emerged in the 19c, piecemeal and in a wide variety of forms, to cope with the 
unplanned, humanly harmful and system-threatening effects of the commodification of 
labour: ‘The extension of the market organization in respect to genuine commodities was 
accompanied by its restriction in respect to fictitious ones’ (p.76). This has given rise to 
the concept of ‘de-commodification’ as a measure of the counter-movement of social 
policy, in the work of Esping-Andersen and others. 
 
However, Polanyi identified two other fictitious commodities alongside Labour: Money 
and Land. The supply and regulation of money has for centuries been a central function 
of nation states. The ownership and regulation of land has also been central to feudalism 
and capitalism, but Polanyi is concerned with something much wider, since Land ‘is only 
another name for nature, which is not produced by man’ (p.72). It is clear now that the 
commodification of land, natural resources, the oceans and nature generates collective 
‘bads’ which stretch out over space and time and which ‘call forth’ (to use Polanyi’s 
phrase) a variety of societal responses. Climate change is the latest and most egregious 
example. In the 21st century it is likely that this will dominate policy-making in a parallel 
way to the ‘labour question’ in the 19th and 20th centuries in the West. This suggests 
another conceptual parallel: just as the ‘social question’ fostered the welfare state, now 
the climate threat is fostering the rise of the ‘environmental state’ or ‘eco-state’, as 
discussed by Dryzek and Meadowcroft. 
 
But these parallels are weak, others argue. The risks addressed by social policies are 
typically individually unpredictable but collectively predictable; those of climate change 
are collectively unpredictable. The Stern Report (2007: 25) points out that CC is global in 
its causes and consequences; its impacts are long-term and persistent; and there is 
serious risk of major, irreversible impacts with non-marginal economic and social effects. 
Furthermore, the uncertainties over the probability distributions of likely outcomes are 
great. According to some theories of uncertainty this itself argues for an explicit 
“precautionary principle” (2007: 38): an additional ‘aversion to uncertainty’ in addition to 
standard ‘aversion to risk’ as a basis for public policies. This is because of the strong 
asymmetry between unexpectedly fortunate and unexpectedly bad outcomes (2007: 
328). The implications are that the risks of CC are quantitatively and qualitatively distinct 
from traditional risks which in the past have fostered the emergence of social policy 
responses. 
Furthermore, the consequences (externalities) of early industrialisation were visible and 
directly felt by many people, which fostered collective organizations and social 
movements to correct them. In contrast the externalities of climate change are distant in 
time and global in space; the material bases for collective mobilisations are weaker. 
These and other theoretical concerns suggest a conceptual separation between 
traditional social policy and the set of environmental policies addressing climate change. 
But the linkages between the two are critical and of growing salience.  
 
However, we may note one other conceptual parallel between the two – the distinction 
between adaptive and mitigating policies. Adaptation refers to ‘measures to reduce the 
 5 
vulnerability of natural and human systems against actual or expected climate change 
effects’, while mitigation refers to ‘policies to reduce GHG emissions and enhance sinks’ 
(IPCC Glossary; see also Stern 2007: 346). There are certain parallels between this 
distinction and an earlier one between protective and productive social policy: whether to 
accept the quantum of human capital or to invest in increasing it, whether to accept and 
protect against unemployment or pursue demand- and supply-side interventions to 
reduce it, whether to adapt to ‘sink estates’ and minimise their harmful effects or to 
invest in community development, and so on (Room 2000). Since the 1930s the 
productive role of social policy has been recognised, though it took back stage during 
the 1980s when the ‘burden’ model was promulgated by neo-liberal economists and 
policy-makers. Meadowcroft sees a potential role for such productive social policies to 
mobilise societal resources to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. 
 
Empirical questions 
 
Climate change is likely to exacerbate social inequalities, lines of conflict and patterns of 
migration. These repercussions need to be explored empirically from a European 
perspective. The table below develops a four-fold analysis of CC implications for social 
policy and gives examples. This suggests some of the dimensions of the future research 
agenda (policy implications are further considered in the next section). 
 
Mapping the impacts of climate change in Europe 
 Predicted effects: 
examples  
Social policy implications: examples 
1. Direct impact of 
forecast climate 
change up to 
2050 
Modest direct impact, 
more adverse in coastal 
areas, Mediterranean 
regions. 
Precautionary policies on housing and 
settlements, new insurance costs, 
health demands of extreme climate 
events 
2. Indirect impact 
of forecast climate 
change up to 
2050 
Climate migration from 
developing world 
New demands for housing, jobs, 
education, health services and social 
protection (but offsetting benefits from 
younger age groups?). Challenges to 
social integration. 
3. Impact of likely 
CC adaptation 
policies  
Opportunity costs of 
making settlements and 
buildings more resilient 
to CC 
Fiscal competition between welfare 
state and environmental state, unless 
synergies are exploited 
4. Impact of 
potential CC 
mitigation policies  
Higher energy costs in 
production, electricity, 
travel, housing. 
 
 
 
Restrictions on 
consumption patterns.  
Regressive effects of carbon taxes and 
pricing and new energy policies: 
implications for social protection. 
New social investment demands to 
reduce carbon emissions of housing, 
transport and employment. 
Numerous policies to change 
consumption behaviour. 
 
These questions must also be interpreted in light of a central concern of social policy, 
both as practical action and academic study: the equity, fairness or justice of particular 
policy outcomes, the distribution of costs and burdens between social groups, and the 
case for redistributive public policies. I consider two dimensions of distribution here – 
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regional and socio-economic – though many more should be considered, including 
gender and age. 
Regional differences across Europe mainly apply to 1 and 2: direct and indirect impacts 
of CC itself. There is a clear north-south gradient in the impact of CC on water supplies, 
food production and health (Stern 2007 ch5). In Europe, the burden of warming and of 
distress migration is likely to impact mainly the Mediterranean countries, as evidenced 
the European heat wave of 2003 and the high rates of illegal immigration in countries 
such as Greece. 
Socio-economic equity is raised by both CC impacts and policies. In the developed 
world, the poorest will be on average more vulnerable to CC for various reasons: lower 
income households are more likely to live in higher-risk areas, marginal lands and 
floodplains; they have fewer resources to cope and have much lower rates of insurance 
cover; they may also suffer from poorer health and resistance (Stern 2007: 148). 
However, the impacts of CC mitigation policies may be still greater. It would appear at 
first sight that essential policies to ration carbon emissions by whatever means would 
hurt the richest, higher-consumption households the most. Ceteris paribus ‘contract and 
converge’ strategies should equalise living standards. However, the immediate overall 
impact of carbon taxes in the EU would be regressive, as Markandya and Ortiz show 
below.  
 
The distributive consequences need careful research within policy areas, perhaps most 
notably in housing. For example, in the United Kingdom, 30% of the poorest quintile of 
households use more energy than the national average, mainly because they live in 
such fuel-inefficient houses (Monbiot 2006: 47; Ekins and Dresner 2004). Thus a fair 
carbon-rationing scheme requires complementary social policies, both to invest in low-
emission housing, transport and communities, and to protect those on low incomes. 
Building standards are much more stringent in Norway, Sweden and Germany: houses 
meeting their building codes use around one quarter of the energy of houses meeting 
the required standards in England and Wales (Monbiot: 66).  
 
 
Policy issues 
 
Before turning to governance, I adumbrate just three policy issues where climate change 
mitigation policies suggest implications – and some possible synergies - for social 
policies. First, the move towards individual (as well as national) carbon budgets holds 
out potentially radical consequences for the theory and practice of redistribution and 
equity, as mentioned above. Strong social policies may well be necessary to address 
emerging inequalities and conflict. The ‘Weitzman paradox’ is relevant here (Weitzman 
1977). This demonstrates that the price mechanism works less well in more unequal 
societies, because prices that discourage carbon consumption by poorer groups will be 
inadequate to restrain the affluent. Thus income redistribution, a concern of traditional 
social policy, could facilitate the use of carbon pricing. In the absence of policies to 
improve social justice the pursuit of environmental justice will require more directly 
interventionist policies such as rationing. 
 
A second area of synergy concerns housing, transport, urban policies and community 
development – areas of social policy relatively neglected by JESP in the past. Heating 
residential homes, and associated residential travel, are major sources of carbon 
emissions in Europe (though far below the USA). The IPCC Report (2007: 389) shows 
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that baseline carbon emissions could be reduced in the residential sector by 29% at 
effectively no cost – the highest scope for reductions in any sector. Countries with very 
inefficient houses, such as the UK, could achieve a win-win outcome by improving 
quality and reducing emissions, if the political will was there. Given the high efficiency of 
housing in some other European countries, there is great scope for policy learning and 
transfer within the EU. Moreover, innovative housing and urban settlements provide 
great scope for the strategy of ‘ecological modenisation’ mentioned by Dryzek.  
 
Climate change mitigation policies will require substantial and rapid shifts in consumer 
and producer behaviour, and this promises a third significant area of interaction with 
social policy. Four basic means are available to governments and other policy makers to 
shift behaviour: education and persuasion; taxation, subsidies and other monetary 
incentives; regulation (including rationing); and environmental engineering. Some 
national and EU health policies, such as discouraging smoking, utilize all four. But there 
is critical experience in social policy of their limits. Incentives that appeal solely to self-
interest may fail when they degrade intrinsic motivations such as altruism and solidarity 
(Jones and Cullis 2000; Bowles 2007). Others recognize the limits of top-down 
approaches and stress the need to engage people and communities in changing 
behaviour. These are lessons also stressed by campaigners for climate change policies: 
Jackson (2005) for example argues that co-production of policies will be necessary if 
fundamental shifts to a low emission economy are to be achieved. There is scope for 
mutual policy learning here. 
 
 
Governance: welfare state and eco-state 
 
One might expect that a new unprecedented set of risks will generate new modes of 
governance, and that is what is happening at national, regional and global levels. After 
several decades of increasing resort to market solutions and the progressive 
marginalisation of the role of governments, the climate change debate brings back 
centre stage the role of public governance. This in two senses: a recognition of the 
contributions to be made by a wide range of actors: government at all levels, the private 
sector, non-governmental actors and civil society (eg IPCC 2007: 82). And a recognition 
that only governments can harness these different components into an effective strategy 
in a short time.  
 
Meadowcroft and Dryzek both address these issues. Meadowcroft charts the emergence 
of environmental governance in the OECD world since the 1960s and identifies five 
major shifts. Both agree that we can now speak of the emergence of an environmental 
state or eco-state. But both contend that this is much more weakly embedded 
institutionally than the welfare state: Dryzek writes ‘we have gazed with envy upon social 
policy, wondering how environmental concerns might ever come to be taken anywhere 
near as seriously by governments as social policy concerns’.  
 
Arriving much later, the eco-state is ‘laired on top of’ different economic systems (‘forms 
of capitalism’), political systems and welfare state regimes (Meadowcroft). One finding 
here is that social democratic welfare states have been pioneers in developing 
comprehensive environmental policies, including climate change mitigation. Using 
Scruggs’ cross-national database Dryzek concludes: ‘Social democratic welfare states 
and what Hall and Soskice call coordinated market economies (the two categories 
overlap substantially) are better placed to handle the intersection of social policy and 
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climate change than the more liberal market economies with more rudimentary welfare 
states’. Similarly, in their research on public support for environmental priorities, 
Gerhards and Lengfeld conclude: ‘Denmark, Finland and the Netherlands, i.e. countries, 
which have developed strong welfare states, have at the same time the highest approval 
rating for environmental protection’. 
 
One reason for this, according to Dryzek, is the discourse of ‘ecological modernisation’: 
a strategy that recognises that climate change can be good for business but which 
requires the governance capacities of coordinated political economies. There are 
important parallels here with the earlier emergence of productive social policies in 
Sweden and other Nordic countries in the 1930s. This policy synergy also builds on the 
greater salience of equity issues in these North European countries. The IPCC Reports 
and the Stern Report illustrate that the threat of global climate change almost inevitably 
raises in stark forms questions of equity and sustainable development (IPCC 2007, chs 
2.6, 12). North European welfare states are therefore best prepared to engage with 
these issues because of their more developed welfare systems. The contemporary result 
is the mainstreaming of both environmental and equality concerns across all areas of 
government in Northern Europe. 
 
However, this rosy picture of synergy may be changing, argues Dryzek. The novelty and 
scale of climate change risks is driving a new governance agenda. Climate change 
policies might displace social policy, providing a new focus of countervailing governance 
in the 21st century. There is a possibility that environmental justice may capture the 
political imagination weakening the traditional concerns of social justice.  
 
Because climate change is an intrinsically global issue, all these pressures and issues 
are multiplied at supra-national levels of governance. This alone would raise the profile 
of EU policies and institutions. But what was perhaps unexpected has been the 
pioneering role of the EU in this area. As Gerhards and Lengfeld note, the EU’s record of 
innovations is extensive, from steering the Kyoto Protocol in 1997 through the first major 
Emissions Trading System (ETS) launched in 2005 to the decision in 2007 to set binding 
emission targets for EU member states. This was enabled, they argue, by the EU 
strategy of ‘frame-bridging’, a specific form of governance spillover. This enhanced role 
for European-level action further builds European governance capacity and may reshape 
the debate on European action in the social domain. Indeed, might one argue that the 
EU remit on environmental action already exceeds its still marginal social dimension? 
 
Finally, in the longer term carbon budgeting will likely lead to a questioning of economic 
growth as a meta-goal of public policy. In the past growth has been broadly perceived as 
a win-win means to accomplish other goals – now it may directly threaten them. This has 
many parallels with new thinking in social policy about non-monetary concepts of 
poverty, capabilities, qualitative indicators of quality of life, concepts of social inclusion 
and exclusion and human wellbeing. This more radical social agenda has never 
displaced the primacy of growth in European policy-making and governance; maybe the 
threat of climate change will force the issue.  
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